



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

### **HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

by

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June 2004

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**HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## **ABSTRACT**

In March of 2002, through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was developed. The original intent of the HSAS was to provide a warning mechanism for the federal government; other state and local agency responses were voluntary. However, the intent expanded to include a warning system for local, state, federal agencies, the private sector and the general public.

Five orange alerts later, the confusion continues with a mix of complacency and misunderstanding. State and local officials complain about the general nature of the intelligence and the lack of specificity directed at regions or targets. The cost of orange protective measures is adding up into the billions of dollars. Warnings specific to New York City have a different value in Utah.

Solutions require a new federal intelligence culture with a new name and location under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security distributing specific intelligence. We need highly trained intelligence analysts working with multi-agency state or metropolitan fusion centers. The media should help in educating the public on the HSAS and promoting volunteer organizations, encouraging participation to assist in Homeland Security and to reduce the fear of a catastrophic event.

Customized HSAS should be developed for each community, state and private sector business to better utilize protective resources. Protective measures should be implemented with specific intelligence to support the elevation of the HSAS.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was announced by Secretary Ridge in March of 2002 as part of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3. The original intent of the HSAS was to provide a warning mechanism for the federal government; other state and local agency responses were voluntary. However, the intent expanded to include a warning system for local, state, federal agencies, the private sector and the general public. The system was confusing and no one understood it.

The system consists of five color codes each associated with a threat level and specific protective measures designed to protect or deter terrorist attacks.<sup>1</sup>

**Low Condition- Green** – is a low risk of terrorist attacks.

**Guarded Condition- Blue** – is a general risk of a terrorist attack

**Elevated Condition- Yellow** – is a significant risk of terrorist attacks

**High Condition – Orange** – is a high risk of terrorist attacks.

**Severe Condition- Red** – is a severe risk of terrorist attacks

### PROBLEMS WITH THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

Since the inception of the HSAS, there have been five national changes in the designation to orange, each time the threats have been generalized to the nation. Each time the threat level goes up federal, state and local jurisdictions implement or deploy costly protective measures. Mayors estimate these measures are costing 70 million per week under Orange.<sup>2</sup> Another estimate according to David Heyman is the orange advisory is costing the nation one billion per week including DHS

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System, March 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Gorman, Siobhan, "State, Local Officials Begin to Question Homeland Security Price Tag," National Journal, April 21, 2003.

operations, state and local governments and the private sector.<sup>3</sup> There are many states and localities that are in deficit spending and cannot continue to respond each time the HSAS changes with non-specific threat information.

The system is too general to differentiate from an orange level in New York City and an orange level in Utah. Currently, it does not matter what the location of the jurisdiction when the HSAS is raised to an orange the entire nation is at orange. There are eleven states and countless local jurisdictions that have taken matters into their own hands and modified the HSAS to fit their needs. For example, Hawaii has added a black level which means an attack has occurred and New York City has three colors, orange, dark orange and red.

The point is, many jurisdictions have identified the problems and are making adjustments and not waiting for the federal government to tell them what they should do to modify the HSAS.

## **ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

Case studies were conducted in New York City and urban and rural communities in Utah. The analyses of the case studies conclude with the following list of specific recommendations needed to develop an effective Homeland Security Advisory System.

- Specific international and domestic intelligence sources should be integrated into all intelligence systems. Intelligence should be narrowed down to the region, state or community. Information should refer to the entire region or just a specific infrastructure, for example pipelines or Embassies. Specificity allows for very detailed actions to be taken in support of the Homeland Security.
- The HSAS is dependent on timely accurate useable intelligence. Critical information should be posted on secure Intel websites for other Intel agencies to utilize. There should be a new culture in federal intelligence systems; it should have a new name in a new location under the

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<sup>3</sup> Chris Strohm, "Homeland Security May Alter Threat Advisory System," Government Executive Magazine, January 9, 2004, David Heyman is quoted in the article and is the director of science and security initiative at the Center of Strategic and International Studies.

direction of DHS. The traditional barriers within the intelligence community will never be broken down in time to prevent the next terrorist act.

- Intelligence work for state and local agencies is a complex assignment. Working in intelligence is not something assigned because of a disciplinary action or because a person is recovering from an injury. An intelligence analyst requires very technical training and years of experience and should be paid accordingly to keep the individual in the position.
- Each state or large metropolitan area jurisdiction, similar to New York City or the Los Angeles<sup>4</sup> area should have a fusion center for intelligence. A localized fusion center is important because there should be a focal point where local intelligence can be fused with federal intelligence and dispersed to all jurisdictions. Connection to the federal Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and to local intelligence jurisdiction is critical to the sharing of information. Each center should be co-located with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to build trust and to enhance the flow of information sharing horizontally and vertically. Membership in the fusion centers should include federal, state and local public safety agencies.
- The HSAS should be adapted or customized to include specific protective measures when the threat information is localized. Each community, state government and the private sector should develop and exercise an HSAS similar to the ones described in Appendix B or C.
  - A simple effective notification system should be implemented from the federal government to the state and to the local jurisdictions. The system should have the capability to be activated from either the federal, state or local jurisdiction. The technology is available to allow for one button activation for a nation wide system that provides timely notification.
- There should be a comprehensive proactive public understanding of what the advisory system means national and locally. The public should be well educated through media public service announcements, volunteer training, school and work awareness programs to enhance the knowledge base, the response capabilities and the continuity of business. If the citizens recognize what is going on during any pre or post disaster scenario, the

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<sup>4</sup> The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group located in the Los Angeles County area is composed of law enforcement, fire, health and emergency management agencies. Their purpose is to gather information and intelligence and analyze the threat and the risk to the area and prepare responses for such attacks.

community's ability to deal with human-caused or natural disasters is increased and the psychological impact of fear is decreased. This will allow the recovery process to move forward and begin the healing and return to normalcy as soon as possible.

The public, public safety agencies and the private sector have all experienced the wave of confusion from the HSAS. Since the unveiling of the HSAS in March 2002, several common themes have emerged; what does this mean to my agency, my community, my business or what does it mean to me. The maturing process of the advisory system has solved some of the issues. Each public safety agency will provide the necessary level of protection and response regardless of the HSAS based on the intelligence they receive. The private sector is going to build redundancy in their business to stay in business or shorten the recovery time. The general public still looks to their government for support and guidance during times of crisis. The element of fear management and the reduction of psychological impacts are reduced with the involvement of the public. There is a sense of purpose and belonging to a volunteer group who identifies with a specific mission. The level of training and exercises eases anxiety and enables the volunteer to participate, function and contribute to the cause.

The Homeland Security Advisory System is a part of larger Homeland Security strategy for the nation to prevent, deter, respond and recover from a terrorist act. It is an example of the collaborative culture we must promulgate around the country in all jurisdictions. We must share, communicate, and we must involve our citizens, our public safety agencies, and the private sector in a comprehensive strategy for providing a safer homeland.



# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is flawed, because it is misleading and falls short of accurately warning a nation of potential terrorist attacks. The HSAS attempts to enforce a high standard that is too vague and costly for federal, state and local protective measures. Changes can be made in the HSAS to provide timely detailed information and efficient application of protective measures. The general public is confused with each advisory, which has lead to extreme behaviors ranging from purchases of large amounts of duck tape and plastic to complacency, lack of interest and no action. The HSAS needs improved information networks that generate specific intelligence to be shared with state and local jurisdictions regarding threats to infrastructure. Increased public awareness and involvement in volunteer programs will reduce exaggerated behaviors and psychological effects on the public.

The HSAS is important to the nation to aid in the prevention, deterrence, and mitigation of terrorist attacks. The color-coded system allows communities, cities, states and a nation to mobilize law enforcement, military and public safety professionals to provide increased vigilance and protection. If the HSAS is modified to meet the needs of the stakeholders utilizing specific intelligence to support the advisory system and provide specific warnings, then we will be able to increase our ability to respond to prevent and deter terrorism.

This thesis analyzes flaws in the HSAS through case studies from several communities in Utah and a case study of New York City. Examples are used from the Israeli culture, which has fought terrorism for over 50 years. Articles and other literature will be used to assist in identifying gaps in our intelligence systems, which have attempted to change since September 11<sup>th</sup>, but have not gone far enough. Cultural change and the adjustments necessary to reduce the psychological

impact of extreme behavior within the general public are also examined. Specific recommendations to the HSAS are made to demonstrate the specific steps to be taken to customize advisory systems for each community and state.

A summary of the cases studies from Utah, New York City and the Israelis compared against the current HSAS reveals several key points:

- Counter terrorism intelligence is not detailed enough to focus resources in specific areas of prevention and deterrence.
  - Intelligence systems have improved since September 11<sup>th</sup>, but have not gone far enough to broaden information sharing horizontally and vertically.
  - There is not a consistent organized intelligence structure at the state and metropolitan level for intelligence gathering and dissemination with local jurisdictions.
  - There is not a professional training certification for intelligence analysts, which are often randomly assigned with frequent turnover.
- When the HSAS is elevated to orange, it applies to the nation.
  - Public safety agencies and the public do not pay attention to the national advisory system.
  - Each public safety agency will provide the necessary level of protection and response regardless of the HSAS based on the intelligence they receive.
- There is a lack of public understanding of the HSAS.
  - During the first alerts, there was a general lack of understanding of the system by the public.
  - There was confusion of what protective steps the public should take.
  - Today, the public does not pay attention to the warnings.
- The Israelis can provide us with lessons because they have battled terrorist attacks for 55 years. They have found that one of the most successful tools in the fight against terrorism is public awareness and involvement.

Recommendations to improve the HSAS include a change in the national intelligence structure, more specific triggers in the HSAS to localize the warning and increased public awareness and involvement.

- Specific international and domestic intelligence sources should be integrated into all intelligence systems. Intelligence should be narrowed down to the region, state or community. Information should refer to the entire region or just a specific infrastructure, for example pipelines or Embassies. Specificity allows for very detailed actions to be taken in support of the Homeland Security.
- The HSAS is dependent on timely accurate useable intelligence. Critical information should be posted on secure Intel websites for other Intel agencies to utilize. There should be a new culture in federal intelligence systems; it should have a new name in a new location under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) because the traditional barriers within the intelligence community will never be broken down in time to prevent the next terrorist act.
- Intelligence work for state and local agencies is a complex assignment. Working in intelligence is not something assigned because of a disciplinary action or because a person is recovering from an injury. An intelligence analyst requires very technical training and years of experience and should be paid accordingly to keep the individual in the position.
- Each state or large metropolitan area jurisdiction, similar to New York City or the Los Angeles<sup>5</sup> area should have a fusion center for intelligence. A localized fusion center is important because there should be a focal point where local intelligence can be fused with federal intelligence and dispersed to all jurisdictions. Connection to the federal Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and to local intelligence jurisdiction is critical to the sharing of information. Each center should be co-located with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to build trust and to enhance the flow of information sharing horizontally and vertically. Membership in the fusion centers should include federal, state and local public safety agencies.
- The HSAS should be adapted or customized to include specific protective measures when the threat information is localized. Each community, state government and the private sector should develop and exercise an HSAS similar to those described in Appendices B or C.
- A simple effective notification system should be implemented from the federal government to the state and to the local jurisdictions. The system should have the capability to be

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

activated from either the federal, state or local jurisdiction. The technology is available to allow for one button activation for a nation wide system that provides timely notification.

- There should be a comprehensive proactive public understanding of what the advisory system means national and locally. The public should be well educated through media public service announcements, volunteer training, school and work awareness programs to enhance the knowledge base, the response capabilities and the continuity of business. If the citizens recognize what is going on during any pre or post disaster scenario, the community's ability to deal with human-caused or natural disasters is increased and the psychological impact of fear is decreased. This will allow the recovery process to move forward and begin the healing and return to normalcy as soon as possible.

## **B. ORGANIZATION**

This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I, "Introduction," introduces the Homeland Security Advisory System failures, the importance of the HSAS for Homeland Security and summarizes the keys points from the case studies from Utah, New York City and the Israelis. Recommendations and solutions to modifying the HSAS are summarized.

Chapter II, "Homeland Security Advisory System," covers the beginning of the HSAS, the purpose of the system and why is it necessary for the nation to have one to fight terrorism. What was the nation's reaction to the elevation to orange. What is the effect of a broad nation-wide alert on state and local public safety jurisdictions. What are the goals of the HSAS and a state HSAS.

Chapter III, "Case Studies," will analyze the reaction to the HSAS by several jurisdictions in Utah and by the New York City Police Department and the Fire Department of New York City.

Chapter IV, "Summary and Recommendations," summarizes the case studies and makes recommendations to fix the HSAS.

The summary points of this chapter are:

- Confusion was wide spread throughout the United States.
- Local jurisdictions expected the state and federal governments to explain what the system means and how to respond.

- Local jurisdictions depend on the state and federal intelligence networks to share information, primarily the JTTF for specific intelligence.
- Local jurisdictions depend on the federal and state governments for timely notification, not the cable news networks.
- State and local jurisdictions will provide the necessary protective and response measures to prevent an attack regardless of what the color code is.
- Public relations are very important in delivering a message to the public.
- Public involvement through volunteer organizations and participation will assist in the protective; prevention and response measures implemented and also minimize the psychological impact.

Chapter V, "Conclusions," summarizes the findings and makes specific recommendations for modifications in the HSAS to aid local and states jurisdictions as well the private sector to react to specific information. The alert information received to date, has been very general in nature. The state and local public safety jurisdictions need specific intelligence regarding terrorist attacks, to allocate resources properly for protective and response measures. DHS did improve the nature of the specific intelligence and alert information during the last orange alert during December 2003 and January 2004, but it is still not specific enough. The cost of protective measures is a burden to all communities and they will either bankrupt themselves into protection or they won't do anything.

The states and metropolitan areas need intelligence fusion centers to collect and disseminate intelligence from the federal intelligence community to the local intelligence community and visa versa. Well-trained intelligence analysts should be apart of the operation. State and metropolitan fusion centers should be co located with the JTTF.

The DHS national notification system for a terrorist attack is the responsibility of DHS. However, the HSAS notification system should have the flexibility to activate from the local jurisdiction as well activated from the state level. The local jurisdictions depend on the state governments to relay the

information from the federal government to the local level, not the cable news networks. So far the cable news networks have been able to speculate on the elevation of the HSAS to orange and provided a timely accurate message. There is technology available to provide instant one button messaging that would simultaneously notify those who need to know.

Each individual, community, state and private sector business should have a customized Homeland Security Advisory System. The HSAS charts should reflect accurate and specific measures to be implemented upon the elevation of the HSAS. (See Appendices B and C)

Utilizing the media to send out accurate information about terrorist warnings will help to reduce the level of fear and panic among citizens. The involvement of citizens will help in Homeland Security vigilance and assist local and state agencies in the response to terrorist attacks. The Israelis have utilized a robust civil guard over the last 30 years to help deal with the variety of terrorism attacks and recovery from attacks. This has helped in dealing with the death and destruction that the terrorists leave behind.

## **II. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

This chapter discusses alert systems; their benefits and why they are needed to fight terrorism. The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) and its purpose, the misinterpretation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 3, the goals of the HSAS and the proposed state goals of the HSAS. The chapter concludes by identifying problems with the HSAS.

### **A. ALERT SYSTEMS**

An alert system is an effective tool to alert the public, public safety and the private sector of imminent danger. A warning system for domestic threats of terrorism would allow the application of protective measures to reduce or deter a terrorist attack. Preparation for the general public means having a 72-hour kit for each individual, having an emergency plan and participating as community volunteers. Public safety officials will have the opportunity to mobilize protective and preventive measures and pre-deploy response resources. The private sector would prepare and implement a continuity of business plan to enhance the ability to return to business as usual as soon as possible. The objective is to minimize down time, mitigate the damage and minimize the loss of life and property.

A warning system for terrorism is very similar to the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which has been used for warnings of pending storms. This system has been in place for years and is often tested on radio and television stations. The EAS is used for imminent storms, such as a tornado, and is activated when lives or property are threatened. This allows for protective measures to be taken by those in its path.

During the Cold War, the Pentagon established DEFCON or defense condition levels to activate defense measures to prepare for a nuclear threat.

Civil defense systems were also developed to alert the general public of imminent attacks.<sup>6</sup> In the 1960's and 1970's, air raid sirens and drills were very common in schools and communities in response to a nuclear attack.

Warning systems are not a new phenomenon for defense forces or the public and have been successfully applied in warnings for violent storms, hurricanes and tornados. The HSAS is the new generation warning system for Homeland Security. However, in this case, if the HSAS is compared to the EAS, one might surmise that when the HSAS is raised to orange, the nation is bracing for a tornado that could touch down anywhere in the United States.

## **B. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

President Bush named Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security on September 19, 2001. In March 2002, through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was unveiled.<sup>7</sup> The National Strategy for Homeland Security was released in July 2002. Included in the strategy under the critical mission area of Intelligence and Warning, is the directive to "Implement the Homeland Security Advisory System." It is critical for intelligence and the HSAS to function in concert with each other because there are dependent upon each other.

The intent of the HSAS is to provide a warning mechanism for the federal government. Other state and local agency responses were voluntary. However, the original intent expanded to include a warning system for local, state, federal agencies, the private sector and the general public.

The Homeland Security Advisory System disseminates information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to federal, state and local authorities, the private sector and the American people. The Advisory system creates a common vocabulary, context, and structure for the ongoing national discussion about the nature of the threats that confront the homeland and the appropriate measure that should be taken in response. It seeks to inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to different levels of government and to

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<sup>6</sup> Dr. James Jay Carafano, "Homeland Security: Alerting the Nation," March 18, 2004, The Heritage Foundation, Delivered to the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Threats.

<sup>7</sup> Office of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System, March 2002.



private citizens at home and at work. The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing the Advisory System.

The Advisory System provides a national framework for public announcements of threat advisories and alerts to notify law enforcement and state and local government officials of threats; they serve to inform the public about government preparations, and to provide the public with the information necessary to respond to a threat. The Advisory System characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions. Each threat condition has corresponding suggested measures to be taken in response. Such responses include increasing surveillance and critical locations, preparing to execute contingency procedures, and closing public and government facilities.<sup>8</sup>

The HSAS consists of five color codes each associated with a threat level and specific protective measures designed to protect or deter terrorist attacks.

**Low Condition-** Green – is a low risk of terrorist attacks.

**Guarded Condition-** Blue – is a general risk of a terrorist attack

**Elevated Condition-** Yellow- is a significant risk of terrorist attacks

**High Condition** – Orange- is a high risk of terrorist attacks.

**Severe Condition-** Red –is a severe risk of terrorist attacks<sup>9</sup>

The following is an example of the protective measures for orange;

- Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;
- Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;
- Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and
- Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only<sup>10</sup>

Included with the orange protective measures are the protective measures from blue, green and yellow added to each other. (See Appendix A for the complete listing)

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<sup>8</sup> National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Office of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System, March 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

The HSAS is obligatory to the executive branch of government and is suggested or voluntary to other levels of state and local government and the private sector.<sup>11</sup> The HSAS since has been used, as a guide for the nation with the implication the system was inclusive for the entire nation, not voluntary. This is another twist to a system with honorable intentions to educate, not confuse the public, public safety and the private sector. Steven Brill claims the color-coded system was never intended for the public, but was designed for government.<sup>12</sup> In any case, today the HSAS is perceived to be a national comprehensive Homeland Security Advisory System to be used by all.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the responsibility of administering the HSAS from the Attorney General's office to the Secretary of Homeland Security and specifically the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).

The responsibility of gathering and analyzing intelligence to determine the nature and the scope of the threat potential against the United States also lies within the responsibility of IAIP. It is important that intelligence and the HSAS are closely tied together, because good intelligence is needed to determine the level and specificity of the alert.<sup>13</sup>

### **Section 201. Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection**

This section specifies primary responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.

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<sup>11</sup> Office of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System, March 2002, this adds to the misconception of the purpose of the HSAS. The perception is the system is inclusive of all federal, state and local areas.

<sup>12</sup> Steven Brill, 'One on One', Government Security News, April 2004, pp. 34-35, Steven Brill is Chairman of The America Prepared Campaign, Inc., a non-profit organization aimed at educating Americans on how they can prepare themselves and their families for a terrorist attack. He is author of the critically-acclaimed, "After: How America Confronted the September 12th Era", Brill enlightens audiences on the safety and security issues America must confront post-September 11th, the challenges faced by the legal system and law firms in this modern, global society, and the media's role and responsibility in today's rapidly changing world. Brill has been a columnist for Newsweek since September 11<sup>th</sup> and an analyst for NBC on issues related to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

<sup>13</sup> Homeland Security Act of 2002, analysis of Section 1, Title II, sec 201, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/>, accessed May 2004.

These include: (1) receiving and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence, and other information in order to understand the nature and scope of the terrorist threat to the American homeland and to detect and identify potential threats of terrorism within the United States; (2) comprehensively assessing the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructures; (3) integrating relevant information, intelligence analyses, and vulnerability assessments to identify protective priorities and support protective measures; (4) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructures; (5) taking or seeking to effect necessary measures to protect those key resources and infrastructures; (6) administering the Homeland Security Advisory System, exercising primary responsibility for public threat advisories, and providing specific warning information to state and local governments and the private sector, as well as advice about appropriate protective actions and countermeasures; and (7) reviewing, analyzing, and making recommendations for improvements in the policies and procedures governing the sharing of law enforcement, intelligence, and other information relating to homeland security within the federal government and between the federal government and state and local governments.<sup>14</sup>

The responsibility of raising and lower the HSAS rests with the Under Secretary of IAIP under the direction of the Homeland Security Council (HSC).<sup>15</sup> Each time the HSAS is elevated the HSC meets to discuss and decide if the intelligence warrants the raising of the alert. Once they have directed the elevation of the alert, they ensure the application of governmental policies and directives and monitor compliance with the predetermined protective measures and other responses.

### **1. Goals of the HSAS**

The National Strategy for Homeland Security clearly identifies specific goals for the HSAS. They are:

- The Advisory System provides a national framework for public announcements of threat advisories and alerts to notify law enforcement and state and local government officials of threats;

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<sup>14</sup> Homeland Security Act of 2002, analysis of Section 1, Title II, sec 201, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/>, accessed May 2004, underlined by author.

<sup>15</sup> The Homeland Security Council is made of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Homeland Security, The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense and other designated by the President. The purpose of the HSC is to coordinate the policies and functions of the United States Government relating to homeland security.

they serve to inform the public about government preparations, and to provide the public with the information necessary to respond to a threat.

- The Advisory System characterizes appropriate levels of vigilance, preparedness and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions.
- The HSAS identifies appropriate protective measures to implement in response to the threat conditions.

The goals or purpose of the HSAS includes alert notifications down to the state and local governments as well as the private sector and the general public. The language from the HSPD #3 states the HSAS is binding to the federal government and recommended but voluntary to the state and local agencies. It is important to note, the two directives confuse and confound what the intent of the warning system is. This may explain problems and issues to be covered in the next chapters. It is clear by the response of the nation to the alerts, that all public safety agencies at the federal, state and local levels have accepted or at least acknowledge the warnings.

## **2. The State Goals for HSAS**

A Homeland Security Advisory System that is beneficial to state and local jurisdictions is a terrorist warning system that is activated from the state or local level dependent upon specific accurate intelligence and the imminent threat. The goals are:

- The Homeland Security Advisory System provides a state and or a local framework for public announcements of threat advisories and alerts to notify law enforcement, public safety, state and local government officials of threats; they serve to inform the public about state and community preparations, and to provide the public with the information necessary to respond to a threat.
- The HSAS identifies specific levels of vigilance, preparedness and readiness in a series of graduated threat conditions specific to the state and local community.
- The HSAS identifies specific protective measures to implement in response to the threat conditions.

## **C. PROBLEMS WITH THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

Since the inception of the HSAS, there have been five national changes in the designation, each time the threat advisory has elevated to orange and have

been generalized to the nation. The nation has responded by changing the threat level to orange. Each time the threat level goes up federal, state and local jurisdictions implement or deploy costly protective measures. Mayors estimate these measures are costing 70 million per week under orange.<sup>16</sup> Another estimate according to David Heyman is the orange advisory is costing the nation one billion per week including DHS operations, state and local governments and the private sector.<sup>17</sup> There are many states and localities that are in deficit spending and cannot continue to respond each time the HSAS changes with non-specific threat information.

The system is too general to differentiate from an orange level in New York City and an orange level in Utah. Currently, it does not matter what the location of the jurisdiction when the HSAS rises to an orange the entire nation is at orange. There are eleven states and countless local jurisdictions that have taken matters into their own hands and modified the HSAS to fit their needs. For example, Hawaii has added a Black level which means an attack has occurred and New York City has three colors, orange, dark orange and red.

The point is, many jurisdictions have identified the problems and are making adjustments and not waiting for the federal government to tell them what they should do to modify the HSAS.

#### **D. INTELLIGENCE**

If intelligence is specific to New York City, then NYC should make the necessary adjustments for protection and security. Why, in this instance, should Utah go to an orange? If there is a tornado warning in Oklahoma, why should Utah brace for it. It is a waste of time and resources. The HSAS has to be modified to fit each jurisdiction. Protective measures should be adjusted to fit each specific community or business.

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<sup>16</sup> Gorman, Siobhan, "State, local Officials Begin to Question Homeland Security Price Tag," National Journal, April 21, 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Chris Strohm, "Homeland Security May Alter Threat Advisory System", Government Executive Magazine, January 9, 2004, David Heyman is quoted in the article and is the director of science and security initiative at the Center of Strategic and International Studies.

It is clear that the federal intelligence community should be overhauled, it needs a new identify, new location and new culture. Information sharing between the federal government, the state and local jurisdiction should be shared freely horizontally and vertically. The old culture of the United States Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Central Intelligence Agency is too bogged down in the traditional sharing of information to implement the needed changes before the next attack.

#### **E. PUBLIC AWARENESS**

To date U. S. citizens have responded with extreme behaviors and confusion over their role in response to the elevation of the threat level. The term shelter in place sent many citizens to the stores in search of duck tape and plastic and gas masks. These are extreme reactions and there are also complacent reactions, those who don't believe the HSAS has any relevance and that a terrorist act on US soil was a one-time occurrence.

DHS did not have a media campaign early in the release of the HSAS. The general public knew only enough about the HSAS to cause panic. DHS should have used public service announcements, training and education of state and local leaders, templates to develop state and local plans and efforts to thoroughly explain the purpose and protocol of the system. Confusion would have been reduced, the over reaction of protective measures would have been substantially minimized.

A majority of U.S. citizens say they want to help prevent another terrorist attack but do not know how.<sup>18</sup> Public involvement through volunteer organizations has served the Israelis well and helped their culture mature enough to treat the bomb explosion like a car accident. Get in, clean it up and move on. Involving the public has reduced the fear and the psychological impacts of terrorism. There are very valuable lessons to learn from the Israelis as we attempt to define the threat, risk, vulnerability and the impact of terrorism.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Chris Strohm, "Americans on Homeland Security: Ready Willing but Uniformed," Govexec.com, May 25, 2004, An article reviewing a report from the Council for Excellence in Government "We the People: Homeland Security from a citizens perspective".

<sup>19</sup> Please reference Appendix D for more details on the Israeli strategy for fighting terrorism.

The United States has a foundation of volunteer organizations already established with a tradition of care and assistance worldwide. The collaboration of all the volunteer groups will help direct volunteer resources to their fullest utilization.

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### **III. CASE STUDIES**

This chapter will address the Homeland Security Advisory System issues that Utah and the City of New York experienced shortly after the implementation of the HSAS in March 2002. The case studies were developed from a list of questions asked during interviews with city, county and state leaders. Each case will unveil similar issues, concerns, and apply solutions to solve local jurisdictional issues. This is a reflection of what is really happening at the ground level.

#### **A. UTAH CASE STUDY**

In March of 2002, the White House Office of Homeland Security presented the Homeland Security Advisory System. At the state level, there was a lot of curiosity and lack of specific information regarding this new system. The Governor's Homeland Security Task Force under the direction of Utah Department of Public Safety Commissioner and Homeland Security Advisor, Robert Flowers took an aggressive approach to develop protocols and protective measures to fit within the national HSAS. The Task force proposed a solution to the vagueness of the federal system by developing a model HSAS specific to Utah.<sup>20</sup> The big question, what does this mean to Utah?

The task force developed the Utah version (or a state and local version) of the National HSAS (see Appendix B). It is very similar to the national model, but is more specific to the state or the local area. The system was simple, straightforward and understandable. The Office of Homeland Security asked if they could use Utah's model as an example of a best practice. The Utah Homeland Security Advisory System was approved for use.

The first official national elevation of the HSAS was in September of 2002. Officials in Utah followed with the rest of the nation, but questioned what Utah was doing to increase the security and other protective measures. In February

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<sup>20</sup> Utah Governor Michael Leavitt created the Utah Homeland Security Task Force in October 2001. This Task Force was under the direction of Commissioner Robert L. Flowers of the Utah Department of Public Safety.

2003, the nation's level was again raised to an orange advisory. The information related to terrorist activity in the Middle East and to chatter from international intelligence sources. Intelligence was not specific to Utah and at the direction of Commissioner Flowers, followed the Utah Plan. The plan confirmed the state's advisory at yellow, because the plan clearly identifies the threat shall be specific to Utah or the region surrounding the state.<sup>21</sup>

A confused media reported the bold move and with a general lack of understanding further confused the story communicating to a bewildered public. Other agencies and members of the private sector followed with simple questions of why didn't the state change to the orange advisory. The education of the public was poor and the lack of understanding was evident throughout the nation and Utah was no exception.

The response that followed was unexpected. There was not an understanding of the national system or the state system by the public or other agencies. The media interest on day one was reporting the Utah story like they would any other story, with one exception. They did not like the fact Utah was not following the nation. Following the plan was common sense. No specific threat, no need to panic and no waste of resources. Utah already had an Intelligence Fusion Center co-located with the FBI, if there was specific information we would have known about it. However, with the timing of the event, our efforts to educate other state agencies, federal and local agencies had fallen short.

Other state and local agencies did not understand why the state was not following the national standard. Commission Flowers handled the press later the next day and the media was still confused over the yellow advisory. After explaining the HSAS and how it made sense for Utah, there was a slow reluctant change in philosophy.

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<sup>21</sup> Utah Advisory System, Department of Public Safety, Robert Fowler, April 2002.

The conclusion of this experience was to follow the national system and not say anything specific about Utah. The bottom line meant Utah in fact was conducting daily routines that realistically fit in the orange advisory level and was the Department of Public Safety's (DPS) status quo. To the public, yellow meant there was no need to panic or waste resources.

There is a need to identify the standard for the state and assist local jurisdictions in developing their HSAS and supporting notification systems, protective measures and associated protocols. Planning, training and exercise for public safety, the general public, the private sector and volunteers will diminish the confusion and promote predictable actions.

"We are working hard to enhance the Utah Homeland Security strategy with our public safety partners. Governor Walker is deeply committed to the efforts of improving our communication network, working on public relation campaigns, working closely with local and federal public safety agencies. DHS should communicate closer with the states; break down the level of communication to the regional level. If DHS had worked with the states and local entities in the beginning of the development of HSAS, there would never have been the confusion we experienced."<sup>22</sup>

#### **1. State Department of Health**

During the second increase to orange of the HSAS, in February 2002, Utah stayed at yellow according to the state plan; the Director of State Health was very confused why the state had stayed at yellow. He did not understand why the state would depart from the rest of the country.

The expectation from other state agencies is to follow the state lead, which is in turn is to follow the national lead. The criteria were based on a reliable and imminent threat to the immediate area or state.

Executive Director Rod Betit and Deputy Director Dr. Dick Melton had serious questions regarding the process of following the national advisory and

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<sup>22</sup> Robert Flowers, Commissioner and Homeland Security Advisory, Utah Department of Public Safety, March 23, 2004.

the necessity of the state or local system. After analyzing the criteria and consequences of deploying protective measures each time, the Department of Health developed their own criteria and specific protective protocols for the State Department of Health and developed similar guidance for each of the health regions and hospitals. The criteria reflects the same specificity as the state HSAS.<sup>23</sup> (See Appendix C)

## **2. State of Utah Summary Points**

The State of Utah's experience with the HSAS:

- A high level of confusion and lack of definition specifically to the state agencies.
- The state added definition to the national system by way of a customized Utah HSAS, which was recognized as a national best practice.

It feels like we are preparing for the Olympics all over again, we just don't know when they are coming.

## **3. Salt Lake City**

Salt Lake City is the largest city in Utah with a population of 181,743, but is surrounded by tens of thousands of citizens concentrated in the Salt Lake valley. The city and the surrounding communities include manufacturing and industrial plants, refineries, and pipelines, large public gatherings similar to any large city or urban area in the United States. Many of the concerns of Homeland Security were echoed during the hosting of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. What are the threats, vulnerabilities, and the risks? Dealing with these issues during the Winter Olympics was stressful, but was easier to define and place a boundary or fence around the venues.

Homeland Security is very similar in comparison to the preparation for the Olympics; however you obviously can't put a fence around it. When the threat advisory system was established no one in city government had any idea what the implications were for policy decision, notification procedures, protective measures and what does it mean to Salt Lake City? When the advisory was changed for the first time, we all heard it on the cable news networks.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Dr. Dick Melton, Deputy Director, Utah Department of Health, March 2004.

<sup>24</sup> Mike Stever, Emergency Management Director, Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2004.

The Salt Lake City Mayor's Chief of Staff called the State Emergency Management office to question the state's notification system and purpose of the national advisory system. Questioning the affects on Utah? The confusion was statewide. Cable news networks were the form of notification.

All local and state jurisdictions were asking the same questions looking for a reason to provide the necessary protective measures to their private and public assets.

The issues of the general threats, the lack of specificity, notification, and the available resources all started to flow into complacency. Mike Stever, Emergency Manager for Salt Lake City believes from the city's standpoint, the national system means next to nothing to us.

The national system was so vague and ambiguous that it actually hurt the credibility of emergency management on the local level with our local officials. Elected officials, specifically the mayor wanted to know what the advisory system meant to the city. No one knew for sure, not the state nor the federal government. It seemed like we were making it up as we went. In general, Homeland Security has caused some procedures to be changed; generally relating to the airport, water, and police operations as well as general security.<sup>25</sup>

Salt Lake City's concerns include the general nature of the advisory and believe the system should have never been called a "national system". Mr. Stever continues,

All alerts should be specific, the feds tell us the nation is on alert, but there is no threat to Utah or Salt Lake City. Are we or aren't we at a high threat level?

There are other threat and warning systems, for example, the military and the national weather service has a warning and advisory system. If there is a tornado warning in Oklahoma, should Utah take the same precautions? The HSAS should be as specific as the weather warning system.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Robert Fowler, State Bureau of Emergency Medical Services, Utah Department of Health, February 2004.

The city relies on the state to provide adequate notification from the Department of Homeland Security, but currently the proficiency of the notification system is poor. Because of the poor performance of the state's notification system, there is very little reliance at this point. Salt Lake City is counting on the state to improve its notification systems.<sup>27</sup>

The frustration of playing to and supporting each threat in the jurisdictions and the state are in a catch 22. The City has to be prepared, but nothing happens; you fight the politics, or something happens and you should have been prepared and fight the politics.

Mr. Stever compares the preparation similar to Y2K. There is a lot of time and energy spent on resources in continuity of government and business, and then nothing happens. The speculation is, why did we waste all the resources for nothing? It is the old emergency management quandary; of preparing for something we hope never happens.

#### **4. Salt Lake City Summary Points**

Salt Lake City's experience with the national HSAS:

- Confusion and lack of understanding of the system
- Lack of direction from the state and from the Office of Homeland Security
- Relied on the state for notification of the elevated advisory to orange, but heard it on CNN instead.
- Salt Lake City developed a HSAS plan for the city that identifies the command structure and what specific decisions to make for notification procedures. The city has developed a HSAS that includes the federal system, but also includes a more specific criteria identifying when the city HSAS should be raised and lowered based on specific threat or intelligence.<sup>28</sup>

#### **5. Washington County (Southern Utah)**

Dean Cox, Emergency Services Director for Washington County. Washington County is the fastest growing area in southern Utah and is a good sample of rural Utah. Mr. Cox said

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<sup>27</sup> Mike Stever, Emergency Management Director, Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Salt Lake City, Homeland Security Advisory System, Mike Stever, Salt Lake City, Utah, February 2004.

we don't pay any attention to the national HSAS. I look at the HSAS and I inherently see a public relations/awareness tool much more so than a meaningful tool for responders at any level: Federal, State, tribal, or local.<sup>29</sup>

A plan exists with a list of standard operation procedures for protective measures to be taken for critical infrastructure protection and security. The criteria used are not significant until there is considerable evidence something is going to happen in the county. The HSAS consists of one page in our plan.

Of course the HSAS's largest problem, in my mind is neither the bias nor the coarseness, but the fact that it does not reflect a quantifiable measure of national risk. Its value to local governmental jurisdictions is virtually nothing without corroborating intelligence that will define the nature of an appropriate response. I feel that the HSAS has always been more politically valuable than of practical significance.<sup>30</sup>

## **6. Washington County Summary Points**

- They don't pay attention to the national HSAS
- The HSAS is a PR tool not a response tool
- Need corroborating intelligence to add value to the system

## **7. Northern Utah/Weber County**

Lance Peterson is the emergency manager for Weber County and co-chair of the Northern Utah Homeland Security Coalition (Northern Coalition).<sup>31</sup> This area was a good sample of multi-urban jurisdiction of Utah. The committee is made of public safety representatives from the neighboring five county area of northern Utah. The purpose of the committee is to build cooperative partnerships for response, intelligence, investigations, health, volunteers, security, prevention and deterrence, an all-hazards approach for imminent threats.

The first time the HSAS was raised, no one understood what it meant. No one had briefed us on it, so there was a lot of confusion. There was concern this was a national system to be used for

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<sup>29</sup> Dean Cox, Emergency Services Director, Washington County, Utah, March 11, 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Northern Utah Homeland Security Coalition is formed from five contiguous counties in northern Utah. This group matured during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games and have continued since 9/11 and evolved into the model multi-agency committee for Homeland Security in Utah.

political purposes. In other words, the jurisdiction must change colors for the purpose of supporting the President, instead of using the HSAS for practical purposes.<sup>32</sup>

The leaders of the Northern Coalition identified the problems with the HSAS shortly after it was released in March 2002. By the summer, the coalition had made the necessary changes in the criteria to reflect a more specific system. The criteria are detailed in a plan, which describes the procedures to follow relying on intelligence from the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The JTTF shares a familiar message: if there were anything going on in Utah you would know about it because we would tell you.

The expectation from the local jurisdictions is for notification to come from the Department of Homeland Security to the state and from the state to the local jurisdictions. Each time there is an increase in the HSAS, there is a responsibility from the state to local jurisdictions to clarify what the meaning is for the state.

#### **8. Northern Utah/Weber County Summary Points**

- Lack of understanding what the HSAS meant
- Purpose of the system was to support the President
- Customized their own HSAS
- Heavy reliance on the JTTF for intelligence
- Expect notification to come from the state

#### **B. NEW YORK CITY**

New York City is unique to the rest of the United States with the exception of the Washington D.C. area. September 11<sup>th</sup> severely influenced the way police and fire, public works and other city services functioned forever in the city.

The Police Department had its own alert system prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>. This four level system included alpha (no threat) to omega (something has happened or is imminent) was active and supported by detailed plans for protection and response.

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<sup>32</sup> Lance Peterson, Weber County Emergency Manager, March 8, 2004.



The adjustment to the national system was minor. It caused us to re-evaluate every element of threat, risk and vulnerability in the city.<sup>33</sup>

New York City has been at omega since September 11<sup>th</sup> and at orange since March 2002 when the new system was announced.

The protocols within NYPD have been identified at each level and there are specific directions for each commander to follow to meet the threat. There are flexibilities built into the protocol book to deal specially with a specific threat or event.

The federal HSAS has orange; we have different shades of orange depending what is going on. For example, we have been at omega/orange since 9/11; if we receive specific intelligence pointing at the city, we will go to a bright orange.<sup>34</sup>

Intelligence is critical to responding appropriately to the threat. There are 146 detectives assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigations New York office. If we need to know, we will find out. There are also a number of detectives assigned over seas to work directly with federal agents, so we are right in the middle of developing intelligence. We are in the direct line of communication. We cannot afford anything less.<sup>35</sup>

Chief Colgan believes the cities continuous orange alert adds to the prevention and deterrence of terrorism because of the high level presence of uniformed officers, National Guard troops, and the use of monitors, detection devices, surveillance and the high quality of intelligence. The Chief is very concerned that federal funds continue to be distributed throughout the country without consideration for the highest threat, risk or vulnerability. Changes have to be made in order to provide the proper protection to the city. The funding system should be risk based and threat sensitive.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Deputy Chief John Colgan, New York City Police Department, Counter Terrorism Task Force, March 2004.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

The Fire Department of New York City also has a similar HSAS system. There are three levels; orange, bright orange and red. At each level there are specific protocols to follow based on the threat. FDNY has also been at orange since September 11<sup>th</sup> and relies on intelligence and notification from NYPD.<sup>37</sup> There is enough flexibility in the protocols to focus on specific threats.

**1. New York City Summary Points**

- They had a similar system for years and the conversion was a minor adjustment
- They have been at omega or orange since September 11<sup>th</sup>
- The system revision caused the city to rethink their vulnerabilities
- The City system defines specific protocols to be followed, but enough flexibility to focus on specific security or protection areas.
- They are proactive with intelligence and do not rely solely on the FBI and the JTTF.

**C. CONCLUSION**

Each jurisdiction at the state or local level including the largest metropolitan city in the country has struggled with defining what influence the national HSAS has on their area of practice. New York City already had a similar system with specific protocols to follow and the adjustment was easy.

The State of Utah and local governments did not have a comparable system nor was there an understanding of what a national system meant to the state. However, common sense prevailed and each jurisdiction developed a HSAS specific to their needs. In each case, the system added specificity and clarity to the public safety community.

Public awareness or public relations was absent in all cases. In New York, there was not a cause of fear or misunderstanding of the HSAS because the city had already survived September 11<sup>th</sup> and it would take a lot more than a new HSAS to concern the citizens.

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<sup>37</sup> Mike Weinlein, Deputy Chief, Fire Department of New York, December 2003.

Utah is another case and I would argue most of the rest of the nation was in a similar situation as Utah, confused. The failure is not that the HSAS is a bad idea, but that DHS did not involve state, local and private sector stakeholders in the process. DHS let the system stand on its own. There was no education of the public, no education for public safety or the private sector.

The HSAS system would have been easily developed and implemented if:

- DHS had consulted with state and local Homeland Security officials and the public sector to help identify and solve key issues and specifically to help deal with the issues of warning and notification.
- DHS had implemented a full media strategy, educating the public developing and delivering a full range of public relation tools, for example posters, PSAs, refrigerator magnets, brochures, training of volunteers, etc.
- Provided templates to all state and local public safety agencies to allow customization of the HSAS system and specific protective measures to fit individual jurisdictions
- Provided templates for HSAS, protective measures and training to the private sector.
- Guaranteed a seamless sharing of information intelligence network to provide specificity to federal, state and local public safety agencies.

If these strategies had been delivered in the beginning, there wouldn't be the confusion now.

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## **IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter summarizes the case studies from the previous chapter and makes recommendations for improvement of the Homeland Security Advisory System. Based on current documentation, the conclusion will be that the HSAS has problems; however, these problems can be fixed. During the last alert in December 2003 and January 2004, more specific threat analysis was provided. Recently, Secretary Ridge said, "We don't have to raise the threat advisory to increase our security."<sup>38</sup>

### **A. DOMESTIC CASE STUDY ANALYSIS**

The domestic case studies revealed several consistencies; 1) in the first four alerts DHS and intelligence sources lacked specific threat or location information, 2) public safety agencies and the public don't pay attention to the national system, 3) each public safety agency will provide the necessary level of protection and response regardless of the HSAS based on the intelligence they receive, and 4) the lack of public understanding and involvement.

And Lets Remember That Those Charged With Protecting Us From Attack Have To Be Right 100% Of The Time. To Inflict Devastation On A Massive Scale, The Terrorists Only Have To Succeed Once.<sup>39</sup>

### **B. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM DEPENDS ON SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE**

The lack of specific intelligence and information relating to the warning caused ambiguity, which lead to confusion of the purpose of the HSAS. The nation quickly recognized that most of the nation was being alerted to an unknown threat.

The most important component to an effective HSAS is specificity. It does not matter if the HSAS is national, regional or local, specificity will allow direct

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<sup>38</sup> Secretary Tom Ridge, Department of Homeland Security, NBC, Today Show, May 26, 2004.

<sup>39</sup> National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, April 8, 2004.

timely applications to prevent, deter or mitigate terrorism. There has to be specificity in the type of target, the method of attack, the specific location of the attack or the suspects.

On the last change in the advisory, December 21, 2003, DHS attempted to be more specific in their warning, identifying the use of aerial assets to attack and the likely locations to launch an attack. There were targets also identified such as Washington DC, nuclear plants and other assets located in proximity of the target areas. DHS officials delayed and cancelled international flights from Europe, based on the passenger lists and the destination of the flight.

These are improvements in the accuracy of the information but the timeliness remains to be seen. There are criticisms with regards to the flight delays accusing DHS of speculation on the intelligence and there is nothing specific. The liability of having to know everything all the time and act accordingly is a heavy weight to bear, but is necessary during the war on terrorism. Imagine the repercussions, if an action was not taken in response to specific intelligence. The 9-11 commission investigated this very example. The expectations are we should have known better.

How long before decisions to let the plane fly or the tanker to enter the harbor, or to allow a border crossing have an economic bearing on the decision making process. In all business affairs the bottom line is money. These decisions may have a short-term effect on industry and perhaps the national economy. This seems to be another sign of complacency or denial when the priorities change back to normal business activities.

Laws don't prohibit the sharing of information, cultural blocks do<sup>40</sup>

### **C. TIMELY, ACCURATE AND USEABLE INTELLIGENCE**

Current domestic and international intelligence systems are not designed to provide information specific enough to be of value to the local and state agencies. The nature of the intelligence to date has been vague at best.

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<sup>40</sup> Tom Wingfield, Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2003.

Notifications of threats to bridges, or to airports are too general and not specific enough. Federal, state and local officials have requested more specific threat information to assist in determining the protective measures to be deployed. Information should be specific enough to break down into region, sector, site or event. This would also allow for a more efficient allocation of resources to a specific area instead of protecting the entire area of responsibility.<sup>41</sup> Recent attempts have been made to narrow the focus which is improving each time.

Specific threats to New York City are provided in briefs that the rest of the country will never know about because of the nature of the intelligence (need to know), but yet critical enough for the entire country to rise to orange. This does not make sense; we must set a higher level of expectation.

In May 2003, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was unveiled as the nation's fusion center for domestic intelligence.<sup>42</sup> This fusion center is located at CIA Headquarters and is responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence. The intelligence community (IC) players include Department of Defense (DOD), United States Secret Service (USSS), Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), US Coast Guard, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), state and local intelligence offices.<sup>43</sup>

The TTIC is an attempt to fuse the nation's intelligence, which has to happen. At the same time, the nation needs the ability to network horizontally and vertically to open sourced intelligence data. Analysts need access to data and secure points of contact necessary to provide analysis to their jurisdiction.

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<sup>41</sup> Risk Communication Principles May Assist in Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, Government Accounting Office Report, Homeland Security, March 2004.

<sup>42</sup> Shane Harris, "CIA Opens New Terrorism Intelligence Center," Government Executive Magazine, May 1, 2003. This article explains the maturation of the TTIC with the main players coming from CIA and FBI and the centers location for now at CIA. The TTIC is separate from DHS, which is supposed to be responsive for intelligence for Homeland Security.

<sup>43</sup> Captain Robert Simeral, Naval Post Graduate School, Notes from Lecture, September 2003.

The now famous August 6, 2001 briefing to the President was de-classified and made available to the public. The contents may be argued for years to come, however the classified document whether historic or not, alone may have meant very little. What if that briefing would have been cleansed and posted on the secure websites. Collectively in a TTIC or other multi-agency fusion center, included with all other intelligence, might have predicted a different outcome.

DHS gathers and analyzes information from the IC and determines the threat potential. IAIP makes the recommendations to the Secretary if the threat advisory should be elevated. Staff further analyzes the timeliness of the data and whether the protective measures at orange are enough to counter the threat. DHS admits the system is subjective and the more specific criteria have not been developed.<sup>44</sup>

#### **D. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS**

It is vital to have local agencies involved in gathering and sharing intelligence from the local and state agencies. There are more state and local eyes than federal eyes; therefore, it is important to share seamlessly horizontally and vertically.<sup>45</sup> Public safety agencies lack the intelligence gathering skills to do the job. These agencies are restricted by budget, personnel, and the proper training. Each state and local agency has to commit to the resources necessary to fulfill the intelligence mission.

Captain Mitch McKee of the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center states the challenge with hiring good analysts is finding quality personnel, paying a competitive salary and providing high quality training. Typically analysts are re-assigned from other law enforcement (LE) duties and don't have specific skills relating to

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<sup>44</sup> Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange, Government Accounting Office, Report to the House Select committee on Homeland Security, February 26, 2004.

<sup>45</sup> Robert L. Flowers, Commissioner and Homeland Security Advisory, Utah Department of Public Safety, March 2004.



intelligence and analyst work. Budgets are extremely tight and once an analyst is trained they move to another job because of higher pay. Analyst training is available from the federal government and from the private sector.<sup>46</sup>

Sgt. John Sullivan, from the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office and the Terrorist Early Warning group (TEW), is concerned intelligence analysts do not receive the necessary training to conduct in depth analysis.<sup>47</sup> There should be a formalized professional training certification to bring a higher standard to analysts. Analysts are not analysts by primary assignment; it is a very technical field and requires extensive training and years of experience and dedication. This is a problem in the intelligence world.

A By-product of the 2002 Winter Olympic games

#### **E. STATE INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS**

A state fusion center is a place where critical information is collected analyzed and disseminated to local, state and federal LE agencies. Traditionally, there is not a recognized organization of intelligence at the state level. In fact in most state, local and federal law enforcement criminal and intelligence structures, there is a cultural block of protection. The state and local law enforcement agencies do not have a formal way to filter and analyze information. In most cases, the information is fragmented and not networked. LE has done a great job of collecting information, but has done a poor job of analyzing and disseminating the intelligence.<sup>48</sup> The intelligence function is a new concept to the local and state law enforcement entities.

At the minimum, each state needs an intelligence fusion center with collaborative representation by multiple local law enforcement jurisdictions. Their purpose is to aid all local jurisdictions in filtering and analyzing the thousands of pieces of information they collect. The center should also function as a feeding

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<sup>46</sup> Captain Mitch McKee, Utah Criminal Intelligence Center, Utah Department of Public Safety, March 2004.

<sup>47</sup> Sgt John Sullivan interview September 2003, Monterey, California; John had his analysts attend FBI and CIA analyst training, which to his knowledge is the best around. But is it enough?

<sup>48</sup> Captain Mitch McKee, Utah Criminal Intelligence Center, Utah Department of Public Safety, March 2004.

point to the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).<sup>49</sup> The JTTF and the state fusion center should be co-located to aid in building trust and information sharing capability. The idea of the co-location is about building relationships face to face with other local, state and federal analysts and the FBI. There are various levels of success at each JTTF. In Utah, the system is working very well. The connection between the JTTF and the TTIC is paramount to bringing the level of international and domestic terrorism intelligence to the local level and vice versa. The JTTF should feed the intelligence to the TTIC and should also receive needed intelligence for dissemination to state and local jurisdictions. All intelligence should flow up and down within the system.

There are many traditional intelligence barriers that should be rebuilt. The TTIC may be the start of a new system, if they relocate to a neutral location and start a new culture and include all the IC players under the direction of DHS. It would be easier to start a new culture with new agents rather than wasting time with the old agents representing old traditions trying to change them.

The Gilmore Commission in their last report recommends the establishment of the TTIC as an independent agency with permanent staff with representatives from state and local government.<sup>50</sup> The report references the development of an MI 5-type domestic counter terrorism intelligence agency with the primary purpose of preventing terrorism. This idea was not very well received at the White House.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Robert A. Martin, "The Joint Terrorism Task Force a Concept that Works," Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network, 2002; The JTTF has two objectives; reactive: to respond to and investigate terrorist incidents or terrorist-related criminal activity; and proactive: to investigate domestic and foreign terrorist groups and individuals targeting or operating in the state for the purpose of detecting, preventing, and prosecuting their criminal activity.

<sup>50</sup> Gilmore Commission Report, December 2003.

<sup>51</sup> MI 5 is a British security intelligence agency. Their purpose is to protect national security and economic well-being and to support the law enforcement agencies in preventing and detecting serious crime. MI5 is responsible for security intelligence work against covertly organized threats to the nation including terrorism, espionage and weapons of mass destruction.

The number of state intelligence fusion centers may vary depending on population density and level of threat. However, the point remains there has to be a state and local intelligence structure for collection, analysis and dissemination.

The prevention and deterrence of terrorism around the world depends on timely and accurate intelligence. If immediate changes are not demanded in culture and systems, people will continue to rely on gut instincts for policy making. The specificity for the HSAS and the efficiency of the warning will continue to be broad and the system will soon die with the loss of credibility.

There are several working models of State Fusion Centers from which to choose, for example, the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC), Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC) and the North Dakota Intelligence Fusion Center. The intelligence centers serve different populations and each reach out to federal and local sources and compress data and disseminate intelligence.

The GISAC was formed following September 11<sup>th</sup> through the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force. The mission of GISAC is to serve as the focal point for the collection, assessment, analysis and dissemination of terrorism intelligence information. GISAC works with the FBI in the collection and dissemination of local and state intelligence information.

The staff includes seventeen agents from state Homeland Security office and task force, bureau of investigations, emergency management, the National Guard, sheriff's association, police chiefs association. Other members include the FBI, DHS and the JTTF.<sup>52</sup>

The Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC) is a by-product of the 2002 Winter Olympic Games and is formatted very similar to Georgia. The level of participation includes members from several divisions within the Department of Public Safety, the Department of Corrections, and the Utah Law Enforcement

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<sup>52</sup> The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center Project, Georgia Homeland Security Task Force, Charlie English, Director of Operations, Georgia Emergency Management Agency, April 2004.

Information Network and other members from local LE agencies. The total staff is 26. UCIC is co-located with the FBI and they work very closely with the JTTF.<sup>53</sup>

The North Dakota Intelligence Fusion Center was also developed shortly after September 11<sup>th</sup> determining the need to collaborate on state intelligence issues. Although the center is smaller than Utah's and Georgia's, it performs the same function of collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence horizontally and vertically throughout the state.

Three different states determined the need within their state jurisdictions and recognized information sharing and intelligence gaps between local, state and federal LE agencies and took on the responsibilities and developed fusion centers to function in this capacity. Each state felt it was important to also involve the FBI and JTTF in their organizations. Fusion center seems to be a consistent theme throughout the country and states are taking the lead and prioritizing the resources to become operational.

New York City determined the need to be much greater than a fusion center for the city. Their intelligence center includes agents assigned in different locations around the world gathering intelligence first hand. Instead of trusting the federal government to share intelligence, New York City is in the trenches working on the front line.

We heard it on CNN

#### **F. TIMELY ACCURATE NOTIFICATION SYSTEM**

Once the IC has established the national intelligence network there has to be a system of notification. The purpose is to notify the proper entities within the state of the threat. In the past, notifications of the warnings have come from the cable news networks; in fact it's a joke. This has been very frustrating to many state and local agencies: this has resulted in the loss of credibility for state and federal agencies. Homeland Security agencies appeared ineffective to the public

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<sup>53</sup> Captain Mitch McKee, Utah Criminal Intelligence Center, Utah Department of Public Safety, March 2004.

and other entities because without notification of the alert change, these agencies do not have time to prepared proper responses.<sup>54</sup> This is not acceptable; a broader more robust local, state and federal system must be established.

Today the DHS has improved, however it is standard practice for agencies to monitor cable news just in case. The DHS still has not formalized protocols for notification. New notification processes have been implemented, for example;

- Conference calls between DHS and the Governor's and their Homeland Security Advisors
- Telephone calls from DHS to federal agencies
- E-mails and phone calls from Homeland Security operation center (HSOC)
- HSOC utilizing electronic systems such as the Joint Regional Information Exchange (JRIES)
- National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS); and
- Email or telephone communications with federal agencies and their chief of staff and other key staffers<sup>55</sup>

Technology is available to deliver the proper notification in a very prompt circumstance. The use of pagers, text messaging, email, fax, the old fashion telephone are all available now in a standard or wireless environment and can incorporated in a elaborate nationwide alert network. It is too easy to create a one-button activation system. Again, it is just a matter of technology to make it happen.

The DHS should stop providing media notifications of pending news conferences to minimize the speculation of the advisory change before it happens. This would allow the DHS to communicate in a timely manner with state and local Homeland Security officials.

There is enough flexibility in the system to target regions or sectors<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Risk Communication Principles May Assist in Refinement of the Homeland Security Advisory System, Government Accounting Office Report, Homeland Security, March 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

## **G. SPECIFIC AND EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE MEASURES**

Protective measures are those steps taken to protect or secure critical infrastructure. Protective measures are implemented when the advisory level changes. The measures are easily incorporated into local plans; the challenge is to determine which protective measures to implement based on the intelligence, instead of all of them. Specificity of intelligence is critical to minimizing the challenge of protecting everything.

Protective measures can range from restricted parking near a building to increasing physical security of a power substation. This depends upon the vulnerability assessments that have been conducted for each community and state critical infrastructure.

The following suggested protective measures come from DHS and recommend basic guidance at each level from yellow to red.

## **H. FEDERAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Yellow**

- Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
- Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
- Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and
- Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans

### **2. Orange**

- Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;
- Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;
- Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and
- Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only

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<sup>56</sup> Chris Strohm, "Homeland Security May Alter Threat Advisory System," quote from Secretary Tom Ridge, Government Executive Magazine, January 9, 2004.

### **3. Red**

- Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;
- Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;
- Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and
- Closing public and government facilities.<sup>57</sup>

At each level, the additional protective measures are compounded to the next level.

## **I. STATE RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Utah Department of Health customized a Homeland Security Advisory System for their agency. The agency includes Utah Public Health and Medical Systems and they divided the protective measures into five areas; Public affairs, epidemiology and surveillance, notifications and surveillance, notifications and communications, preparedness and response and general security provisions. At each level of the Health HSAS there are specific actions to be taken. (See Appendix C)

For example, in epidemiology and surveillance, under a red advisory, the recommendations and considerations are:

- Conduct epidemiologic investigation; coordinate with law enforcement, Utah Department of Health, FBI as needed
- Activate enhanced surveillance protocol and monitor community indicators
- Establish public health surveillance for potential toxic exposures following an emergency
- Determine need for isolation or quarantine measures and activate protocol if needed
- Coordinate veterinary risk assessment-investigation-control measures
- Report clusters of illness, health syndromes and trends to the Utah Department of Health, Office of Epidemiology<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory System, Suggested protective measures, April 2004.

<sup>58</sup> Utah Public Health and Medical Systems, Homeland Security Threat Conditions Protocol, Utah Department of Health, Robert Fowler, 2004.

These are small samples of protective measures that should be customized to each specific infrastructure, agency, community and state entity linked to the HSAS. Protective measures can be determined based on vulnerability assessments measured against threat and risk.

**J. A PROACTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS, EDUCATION AND VOLUNTEER CAMPAIGN WILL ENGAGE THE PUBLIC**

**1. Media**

We all witnessed the fall of the twin towers and the Pentagon burning on September 11<sup>th</sup>; we felt the fear of uncertainty. The United States had never witnessed an attack before, shock, dismay and disbelief was a common reaction. The influence of the media can tell a compelling story and present the facts in a responsible manner and that can be the difference between calm and panic. The media can turn 180 degrees with the power and the influence and speculate the facts and cause undue panic and harm.

The media can be used in a positive manner prior to an event to educate and train the public about the different types of events. The use of public service announcements, specific alerts and actions to be taken can all be communicated on the mediums we already utilized everyday.

The same is true for the reporting of any story that reflects a catastrophic event whether human caused or natural disasters. Media is very influential whether it is newspaper or its television. The old saying, "if it bleeds, it leads" is true, but does this cause more outrage or does it calm and educate? The media can manipulate information in order to increase ratings; however this cannot be done in a time of crisis. Reflection on the media coverage of September 11<sup>th</sup> overall was handled very well.

Hugh Wyatt suggests that the media should take more responsibility for the broadcasts during times of crisis. The broadcasts of false, misleading or the interview by a so-called expert may have psychological affects on the viewers and or the listeners.



Wyatt continues with several practical strategies for determining scenario-based messages ahead of any actual event. Planning ahead would include partnering with well-respected recognizable media talents to assist in delivering a factual message that is believable.<sup>59</sup>

Develop plans with media organizations and agree upon a set of rules dealing the specifics during a catastrophic event. This will improve the quality of the message and reduce the amount of fear imposed by a poor news story.

The media strategy can include a public relations campaign to protect the extreme protective measures taken and detail the work of the state, local and federal intelligence agencies. We can use the art of deception to show what is being done on the ground. The message would be specifically designed for terrorist that might be watching. This could be another tool for prevention and deterrence of terrorism. Deception has been used in previous wars very effectively. Instead what we see is the under cover reporter walking in the open gate at a chemical plant attempting to show all of our vulnerabilities. The media wants to expose us instead of protect us.

Another planned component mention early as being a challenge, can be changed into an asset. I talked about the media always notifying the public of an alert change before the state and local Homeland Security Advisors were notified. Ordain the media as one of the official sources of notification. Utilize the private sector connectivity and integration to the advantage. If you can't beat them, join them.

## **2. Public Awareness**

The basis for the misunderstandings and the gaps of the Homeland Security Advisory System evolve around poor public relations information. The big problem was the broad misinterpretation by public safety, the general public and the private sector.

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<sup>59</sup> Hugh W. Wyatt, *The Role and Responsibility of the Media in the Event of a Bioterrorist Act*, J Public Health Management Practice, Aspen Publishers, Inc., pp. 63-67.

Not one entity understood the HSAS when it was first released and they didn't understand during the initial elevation of the threat levels. A public awareness campaign did not inform all public safety entities about HSAS. There were no specific actions, how to implement, no training, no planning, no exercises, and no funding.

Currently, a large portion of the public no longer pays attention to the HSAS. For example, New York City has been at orange for almost two years. Complacency has replaced confusion because the general public has all but given up on understanding the system. What can be done to minimize the negative reaction of fear and encourage a positive reaction of calm and response? If terrorism is designed to cause fear, then we must find a way to increase the information flow and educate the public to diminish or mitigate the fear factor. A lot can be done in the training of volunteers and educating the general public about the HSAS and to encourage involvement through volunteerism.

Best practices can be learned from the Israelis through their public involved programs implemented during 55 years of terrorism. The Israelis engaged in an extensive cooperative effort between the police, security agencies and the public.<sup>60</sup> The United States needs a new culture and a public strategy to win the war on terrorism. Our goals should be similar to those of Israel:

- Prevent terrorism and minimize damage
- Prevent public panic and extreme reactions
- Channel the public to act productively

We have to get the public educated, involved and increase the awareness of terrorism. Training should include: preparedness, motivation, security measures prior to an attack, reactive behavior to a threat advisory or an attack, how to communicate and emergency planning and exercise, etc.

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<sup>60</sup> Reference Appendix D for more details on the Israelis strategy for fighting terrorism.

There are many volunteer organizations across the nation, which have been established for many years and have served honorably in many different capacities. The American Red Cross, Community Emergency Response Teams, Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corp, Volunteer Organizations Active In Disasters, Neighborhood Watch, Search and Rescue Organizations, Americorps, Citizen Corp and many more.

These organizations have already established the foundation by which the public as well as the public safety and the private sector can utilize. However, the next step should be taken to enhance their skills through additional training to include Homeland Security elements. Employ those skills on a regular basis through planning and exercises. There is always a citizen's organization to participate actively in the crisis response. The challenge in America is complacency. Fighting terrorism on our soil is as important as the moment. Once the moment passes the opportunities for awareness, training and education has passed also. Other issues rise to the top. The United States does not have the weekly terrorist activity Israel has. If it did, U.S. citizens would be front and center.

U.S. citizens have come a long way and the use of their eyes through vigilance has assisted in law enforcement and terrorist related activities and it is important to note that there are many more citizens than state and federal law enforcement officials. If the war on terrorism is brought to our streets through the use of a car bomb or suicide bombers, there would be more urgency and the focus to succeed.

The Israeli police produce commercials on TV and utilize other mediums to enhance public awareness. The United States must do the same type of thing utilize the media better to inform and educate the public long before an event. The bottom line is terrorism in Israel is a concern to everyone and a high priority. They are determined to succeed and so should the United States.

A good public relations campaign utilizing the media when the Department of Homeland Security first unveiled the HSAS would have minimized the misunderstanding of the system, better utilized resources, and provided more efficient respond mechanisms. A prepared general public with full knowledge and understanding of advisory systems trained through community programs and the capability to respond will go a long way to assist public safety agencies.

Our communities need to develop the same kind of intensity and resolve to not fall victim, but rise to the occasion and to do what has to be done to protect the homeland and defeat terrorism.<sup>61</sup> Knowledge has to inspire, not lure into complacency. Complacency leads to inactivity and non-participation.

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<sup>61</sup> The Israel Experience in Homeland Security, Presentation and briefing at the National Emergency Management Association meetings Washington DC, February 2003, There are four points to the Israelis program and they are Public Awareness and Participation, Coordinating the Response Elements, Israel Defensive Force (IDF) Command and NBC Preparedness, Hospital Preparedness and the National Center for Medical Simulation.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter summarizes the recommendations for improvements to the HSAS, and concludes that a need exists for a State and Local Homeland Security Advisory System (SLHSAS). A SLHSAS is a customized version of the HSAS that will have specific triggers to specific protective measures to protect state and local assets. The (SLHSAS) can be activated along with the HSAS or separately by any appropriate agency using specific criteria.

It is not possible to roll back the clock and prevent what happened on September 11<sup>th</sup>. However, it is possible to prevent and deter future attacks on the domestic front. It is our job and our duty.

The Department of Homeland Security implemented an advisory system primarily designed for the federal government to utilize. Today the HSAS is a system used to inform the public, the public safety community and the private sector. The five colored system did not work out as planned by DHS; confusion reined, billions in resources were expended, general warnings were issued, protective measures were applied and there was an overall sense of urgency nationwide. An advisory applied to New York City has a different value in Utah.

A year ago, the HSAS was the subject of controversy and misunderstanding among local, state and federal officials. Since then there has been many articles, audits and research conducted analyzing the faults and failures of the HSAS. The Gilmore Commission, The Government Accounting Office, The Rand Corporation, The Markle Foundation, The Council of State Governments and many others have testified, researched and made recommendations regarding the HSAS.

Many local and state jurisdictions have not waited for the federal government to render a new policy regarding the HSAS, they have determined with the use of common sense the need to develop a local HSAS system that details the specific nature of the threat, protective measures to implement and the response mechanisms to deal with terrorism. The entire system is dependent

on the variable of available intelligence and accurate warning systems. Without both, implementing or not implementing protective measures is a pure gamble.

The ultimate outcome is to provide enough specific intelligence to the local, regional or state, and federal jurisdictions to allow executive decisions to be made based on vulnerability, threat and risk to protect citizens, critical infrastructures and other visible targets from terrorists. Homeland Security Advisory Systems should have the flexibility to raise and lower the color code based on specific information relating to each jurisdiction. For example, a local jurisdiction should have enough flexibility to elevate the HSAS without the rest of the country elevating.

#### **A. ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM**

Below is a list of specific recommendations needed to develop an effective Homeland Security Advisory System.

- Specific intelligence sources from international and domestic integrated intelligence systems. Intelligence narrowed down to the region, state or community. Information may refer to the entire region or just a specific infrastructure, for example pipelines or Embassies. Specificity allows for very specific actions to be taken in support of the Homeland Security.
- The HSAS is dependent on timely accurate useable intelligence. The traditional intelligence barriers will never be broken down in time to prevent the next terrorist act. The result is information setting on a shelf or in a drawer or marked irrelevant, instead of sharing it on a multi-agency open sourced network. There is a need for a new culture in federal intelligence systems; it should have a new name in a new location under the direction of DHS. The purpose is to counter the old cultures of the FBI, CIA, USSS, NorthCom and others.
- Intelligence work for state and local agencies is a complex assignment. Working in intelligence is not something assigned because of a disciplinary action or recovering from an injury. An intelligence analyst requires very technical training and years of experience and should be paid accordingly to keep the individual in the position. There is a high level of expectation.

- Each state or large metropolitan jurisdiction, similar to New York City and Los Angeles area should have a fusion center for intelligence. A localized fusion center is important because there should be a focal point where local intelligence can be fused with federal intelligence and dispersed to all jurisdictions. Connection to the federal TTIC and to local intelligence jurisdiction is critical to the sharing of information. Each center should be co-located with the JTTF's to build trust and to enhance the flow of information sharing horizontally and vertically. Membership in the fusion centers should include a diversity of federal, state and local public safety agencies.
- The HSAS should be adapted or customized to include specific protective measures when the threat information is localized. Each community, state government and the private sector should develop and exercise a State and Local Homeland Security Advisory System (SLHSAS) similar to the ones described in Appendices B or C.
  - A simple effective notification system should be implemented from the federal government to the state and down to the local jurisdictions. The system should have the flexibility to be activated from any jurisdiction. The nature of the notification should move from a joke to reality whether the existing cable news networks are directly apart of the solution or not. The technology is available to allow for one button activation for a nation wide system that provides accurate timely notification.
- Finally, a comprehensive proactive public understanding of what the advisory system means national and locally. The public should be well educated through the media public service announcements, volunteer training, school and work awareness programs to enhance the knowledge base, the response capabilities and the continuity of business. If the citizens know what is going on during any pre or post disaster scenario, the community's ability to deal with the human caused or natural disasters is increased and the psychological impact of fear is decreased. This will allow the recovery progression to move forward and begin the healing process and the return to normalcy as soon as possible.

The public, public safety agencies and the private sector have all experienced the wave of confusion from the HSAS. Since the unveiling of the HSAS in March 2002, several common themes have emerged; what does this mean to my agency, my community, my business or what does it mean to me. The maturing process of the advisory system has solved some of the issues. Each public safety agency will provide the necessary level of protection and

response regardless of the HSAS based on the intelligence they receive. The private sector is going to build redundancy in their business to stay in business or shorten the recovery time. The general public still looks to the government for support and guidance during times of crisis. The element of fear management and the reduction of psychological impacts are reduced with the involvement of the public. There is a sense of purpose and belonging to a volunteer group who identifies with a specific mission. The level of training and exercises eases anxiety and enables the volunteer to participate, function and contribute to the cause.

The Homeland Security Advisory System is a part of larger Homeland Security strategy for the nation to prevent, deter, respond and recover from a terrorist act. It is an example of the collaborative culture we must promulgate around the country in all jurisdictions. We must share, communicate, and we must involve our citizens, our public safety agencies, and the private sector in a comprehensive strategy for providing a safer homeland.



## APPENDIX A. HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM

### Understanding the Homeland Security Advisory System

#### Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies

The following Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are some suggested Protective Measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate agency-specific Protective Measures:



Homeland Security  
Advisory System

**1. Low Condition (Green).** This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:

- Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures;
- Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and
- Institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

**2. Guarded Condition (Blue).** This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations;
- Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and
- Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.

**3. Elevated Condition (Yellow).** An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
- Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions;
- Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and
- Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.

**4. High Condition (Orange).** A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations;
- Taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation;
- Preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and
- Restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.

**5. Severe Condition (Red).** A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement:

- Increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs;
- Assigning emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources;
- Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and
- Closing public and government facilities.

From: Department of Homeland Security website  
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29>, June 3, 2004

## APPENDIX B. UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY HOMELAND SECURITY

### TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS

THREAT CONDITION	CRITICAL FACILITIES PROTECTIVE ACTION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS	ANTICIPATED PUBLIC RESPONSE
<b>S E V E R E</b>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition SEVERE and explain expected actions.</li> <li>• Deploy security personnel based on threat assessments.</li> <li>• Close or restrict entry to the facility to emergency personnel only and restrict parking areas close to critical buildings.</li> <li>• Maintain a skeleton crew of essential employees.</li> <li>• Deploy emergency response and security teams.</li> <li>• Activate Operations Center and send a liaison to the county or state EOC.</li> <li>• Maintain close contact with local law enforcement.</li> <li>• Be prepared to implement mutual aid agreements with government and with other critical facilities.</li> <li>• Provide security in parking lots and company areas.</li> <li>• Report suspicious activity immediately to local law enforcement.</li> <li>• Restrict or suspend all deliveries and mail to the facility. Emergency supplies or essential shipments should be sent to and off-site location for inspection.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition SEVERE to employees and to the public and explain anticipated actions that should be taken.</li> <li>• Deny unauthorized access to critical facilities and infrastructure. Continue 100% inspections of personnel, vehicles and packages.</li> <li>• Visually inspect the interior and undercarriage of vehicles entering parking lots and terraces.</li> <li>• Deploy equipment assets and ensure physical security measures be afforded to them at critical sites.</li> <li>• Assemble trained volunteers to assist in emergency operations.</li> <li>• Implement Mutual Aid Agreements as required.</li> <li>• Continue to assess the vulnerability of key assets and facilities. Take appropriate action to protect them by deploying armed security forces to these sites.</li> <li>• Cancel or delay unnecessary employee travel and leave.</li> <li>• Activate the Emergency Operations Center.</li> <li>• Control release of information to the public and news media.</li> <li>• Send a public Information Officer to the state Joint Information Center (JIC).</li> <li>• Provide security for personnel dispatched to repair or restore damaged facilities and systems.</li> </ul>	<p><b>In addition to all previously mentioned precautions, citizens are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Report suspicious activities and call 9-1-1 for immediate response.</li> <li>• Expect delays, searches of purses and bags and restricted access to public buildings.</li> <li>• Expect traffic delays and restrictions.</li> <li>• Take personal security precautions to avoid becoming a victim of crime or terrorist attack.</li> <li>• Avoid crowded public areas and gatherings.</li> <li>• Do not travel into areas affected by the attack or is an expected terrorist target.</li> <li>• Keep emergency supplies accessible and automobile fuel tank full.</li> <li>• Be prepared to evacuate your home or shelter in place on order of local authorities.</li> <li>• Report persons taking photographs of critical facilities, asking detailed questions about physical security or dressed inappropriately for weather conditions (suicide bomber) to law enforcement authorities.</li> <li>• Closely monitor news reports and Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio/TV stations.</li> <li>• Assist neighbors who may need help.</li> <li>• Avoid passing unsubstantiated information and rumors.</li> </ul>

**Definition: A terrorist attack has occurred or credible and corroborated intelligence indicates that one is imminent. Normally, this threat condition is declared for a specific location or critical facility."**

<b>THREAT CONDITION</b>	<b>CRITICAL FACILITIES PROTECTIVE ACTION</b>	<b>LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS</b>	<b>ANTICIPATED PUBLIC RESPONSE</b>
<b>H I G H</b>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition HIGH to all employees and explain expected actions.</li> <li>• Place emergency response teams on notice.</li> <li>• Activate the operations center if required.</li> <li>• Monitor world and local events. Pass on credible threat intelligence to key personnel.</li> <li>• Ensure appropriate security measures are in place and functioning properly.</li> <li>• Instruct employees to report suspicious activities, packages and people.</li> <li>• Search all personal bags, parcels and require personnel to pass through magnetometer, if available.</li> <li>• Restrict vehicle parking close to buildings.</li> <li>• Inspect intrusion detection systems and lighting, security fencing and locking systems.</li> <li>• Inspect all deliveries and consider accepting shipments only at off-site locations.</li> <li>• Remind employees to expect delays and baggage searches.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition HIGH to employees and public and explain expected actions to be taken.</li> <li>• Restrict or control access to government buildings, critical facilities and infrastructure.</li> <li>• Erect outside barricades, security checks to deny access to underground parking areas, loading docks and building entrance.</li> <li>• Require identification, sign-in and escorts as required.</li> <li>• Restrict parking areas located close to buildings or critical facilities.</li> <li>• Remove trash containers, dumpsters and mailboxes located near government buildings and facilities.</li> <li>• Closely monitor available security and intelligence data from state and local law enforcement agencies.</li> <li>• Instruct employees to be especially watchful for suspicious or unattended packages and articles received through the mail service.</li> <li>• Inspection buildings and parking areas for suspicious packages.</li> <li>• Implement rumor control to avoid public panic.</li> <li>• Employ armed security at airports, dams, public utilities and critical facilities.</li> <li>• Based on threat assessment, define rules of engagement and authorize use of deadly force.</li> <li>• Test communication plans.</li> <li>• Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, vehicles, and parking and storage areas for intrusion.</li> <li>• Conduct 100% verification of deliveries and restrict shipments.</li> </ul>	<p><b>In addition to all previously mentioned precautions, citizens are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resume normal activities but expect some delays, baggage searches and restrictions as a result of heightened security at public buildings and facilities.</li> <li>• Continue to monitor world and local events as well as local government threat advisories.</li> <li>• Report suspicious activities at or near critical facilities to local law enforcement agencies by calling 9-1-1.</li> <li>• Avoid leaving unattended packages or brief cases in public areas.</li> <li>• Inventory and organize emergency supply kits and discuss emergency plans with family members. Reevaluate meeting location based on threat.</li> <li>• Consider taking reasonable personal security precautions. Be alert to your surroundings, avoid placing yourself in a vulnerable situation and monitor the activities of your children.</li> <li>• Maintain close contact with your family and neighbors to ensure their safety and emotional welfare.</li> </ul>

**Definition: Credible intelligence indicates that there is a high risk of a local terrorist attack but a specific target has not been identified.**

<b>THREAT CONDITION</b>	<b>CRITICAL FACILITIES PROTECTIVE ACTION</b>	<b>LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS</b>	<b>ANTICIPATED PUBLIC RESPONSE</b>
<b>E L E V A T E D</b>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition ELEVATED to employees.</li> <li>• Review vulnerability and threat assessments and revise as needed.</li> <li>• Identify and monitor governmental information sharing sources for warnings and alerts.</li> <li>• Update and test call down list for emergency response teams and key employees.</li> <li>• Review and coordinate and update mutual aid agreements with other critical facilities and government agencies.</li> <li>• Establish and monitor active and passive security measures.</li> <li>• Review employee training on security precautions (bomb threat procedures, reporting suspicious packages, activities and people).</li> <li>• Conduct communications checks to ensure radio contact can be established.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Announce Threat Condition ELEVATED to employees and to the public.</li> <li>• Review physical security plans for critical facilities.</li> <li>• Assess potential terrorist targets and develop plans to counteract an attack.</li> <li>• Conduct vulnerability assessments of each critical facility and government building. Estimate the consequence of loss and assign a priority for their protection.</li> <li>• Ensure all buildings are secured to prevent theft or tampering.</li> <li>• Conduct physical inspection of buildings for suspicious unattended packages.</li> <li>• Develop a cadre of trained volunteers.</li> <li>• Closely monitor current news events and state and federal terrorist advisories.</li> <li>• Keep the public informed on current threat conditions and advisories.</li> <li>• Coordinate with adjacent municipalities for mutual aid support in the event of a disaster or terrorist threat.</li> <li>• Conduct tabletop and functional exercises to ensure that response plans are understood and current.</li> <li>• Review existing physical security measures employed and install intrusion detection systems as funding permits.</li> <li>• Conduct weekly radio communication checks.</li> </ul>	<p><b>In addition to all previously mentioned precautions, citizens are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue normal activities, but report suspicious activities to the local law enforcement agencies.</li> <li>• Take a first aid or Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) class.</li> <li>• Become active in your local Neighborhood Crime Watch program.</li> <li>• Network with your family, neighbors and community for mutual support during a disaster or terrorist attack.</li> <li>• Learn what critical facilities are located in your community and report suspicious activities at or near these sites.</li> <li>• Attend your local emergency planning committee (LEPC) meeting to learn more about local hazards. (Call the city/county emergency manager to learn dates and locations of the meetings.)</li> <li>• Increase individual or family emergency preparedness through training, maintaining good physical fitness and health, and storing food, water and emergency supplies.</li> </ul>

**DEFINITION: ELEVATED RISK OF TERRORIST ATTACK BUT A SPECIFIC REGION OF THE USA OR TARGET HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED.**

THREAT CONDITION	CRITICAL FACILITIES PROTECTIVE ACTION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS	ANTICIPATED PUBLIC RESPONSE
<b>G U A R D E D</b>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure that key leaders are familiar with the emergency response and business resumption plans.</li> <li>• Review, update and routinely exercise for functional areas of plans.</li> <li>• Review and update the call down list for emergency response teams</li> <li>• Develop or review Mutual Aid agreements with other facilities and/or with local government for use during emergencies.</li> <li>• Review physical security precautions to prevent theft, unauthorized entry or destruction of property.</li> </ul> <p>Have you provided for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employee picture ID badges?</li> <li>• Background checks on all employees?</li> <li>• Access control and locking of high security areas at all times?</li> <li>• All security keys marked with "Do not Duplicate?"</li> <li>• Surveillance Cameras?</li> <li>• Backup power?</li> <li>• An alarm system?</li> </ul>	<p><b>Continue all precautions from lower Threat Conditions.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Estimate the threat vulnerability of each critical facility and the countermeasures required to protect them.</li> <li>• Ensure that each department is familiar with their assigned responsibilities during a disaster as shown in the plan and are prepared to respond.</li> <li>• Review communications plans and ensure the call-down procedures are current and accurate.</li> <li>• Conduct emergency management training and exercise emergency response plans.</li> <li>• Ensure all emergency management and response functions are adequately staffed. Recruit and train volunteers to augment full time staff.</li> <li>• Actively support the Neighborhood Watch, Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) and other Freedom Corps programs.</li> <li>• Remind citizen and employees to be alert for suspicious packages, activities, vehicles and to report these occurrences to the proper authority.</li> <li>• Secure buildings, unused rooms, storage areas, equipment and vehicles to prevent theft, tampering or destruction.</li> <li>• Evaluate information available on public websites that could compromise security.</li> <li>• Encourage all citizens and employees to have necessary immunizations.</li> </ul>	<p><b>In addition to all previously mentioned precautions, citizens are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue normal activities but be watchful for suspicious activities. Report criminal activity to local law enforcement.</li> <li>• Review family emergency plans.</li> <li>• Increase family emergency preparedness by purchasing supplies, food and storing water.</li> <li>• Be familiar with local natural and technological (man made) hazards in your community.</li> <li>• Increase individual or family emergency preparedness through training, maintaining good physical fitness and health, and storing food, water and emergency supplies.</li> <li>• Monitor local and national news for terrorist alerts.</li> <li>• Update immunizations.</li> <li>• Volunteer to assist and support the community emergency response agencies.</li> </ul>

**Definition: General Risk with no credible threats to specific targets.**

THREAT CONDITION	CRITICAL FACILITIES PROTECTIVE ACTION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS	ANTICIPATED PUBLIC RESPONSE
<b>L O W</b>	<p><b>Managers of critical facilities are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop emergency response and business resumption plans.</li> <li>• Encourage and assist employees to be prepared for personal, natural and technological emergencies.</li> <li>• Develop a communications plan for emergency response and key personnel</li> <li>• Conduct training for employees on physical security precautions.</li> <li>• Budget for physical security measures.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Local governments are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify critical facilities that may need protection.</li> <li>• Review Emergency Response Plans.</li> <li>• Conduct training, seminars, workshops and exercises using the emergency response plans.</li> <li>• Conduct emergency preparedness training for citizens and employees.</li> <li>• Encourage response agencies (fire fighters, law enforcement, EMS, public works and elected officials) to take emergency management and American Red Cross first aid and CPR training.</li> <li>• Provide emergency preparedness information to employees via paycheck stubs tips, newsletters, articles and posters.</li> <li>• Conduct routine inventories of emergency supplies and medical aid kits.</li> <li>• Budget for physical security measures.</li> <li>• Encourage programs for employee immunization and preventive health care</li> </ul>	<p><b>Citizens are advised to:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to enjoy individual freedom. Participate freely in travel, work and recreational activities.</li> <li>• Be prepared for disasters and family emergencies. (See DESHS and American Red Cross brochures.)</li> <li>• Develop a family emergency plan. (See DESHS and American Red Cross brochures.)</li> <li>• Know how to turn off your power, gas and water service to your house.</li> <li>• Know what hazardous materials are stored in your home and how to properly dispose of unneeded chemicals.</li> <li>• Support the efforts of your local emergency responders (fire fighters, law enforcement and emergency medical service).</li> <li>• Know what natural hazards are prevalent in your area and what measures you can take to protect your family.</li> </ul>
<b>Definition: Low risk of terrorism. Routine security is implemented to preclude routine criminal threats.</b>			

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## APPENDIX C. UTAH PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SYSTEMS – HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT CONDITIONS PROTOCOLS

### Notifications and Communications

REFERENCE NUMBER	RECOMMENDATIONS / CONSIDERATIONS	ENTITY	GREEN	BLUE	YELLOW	ORANGE	RED
	Activate notification procedures for changes in threat levels		X	X	X	X	X
	Update call down rosters		Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Monthly	Monthly
	Update outside agency contact lists		Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Monthly	Monthly
	Disseminate security and intelligence data from state and local law enforcement agencies		X	X	X	X	X
	Keep staff informed on changing threat advisories.		X	X	X	X	X
	Provide timely information to employees to control rumors and misinformation.		X	X	X	X	X
	Establish communications with additional jurisdictions and institutional contacts, as needed		X	X	X	X	X
	Issue Public Health Alerts to local health care providers according to Alert Protocol		X	X	X	X	X
	Perform tests of communication between UDOH, LHD's, hospital, and emergency response partners.		Quarterly	Quarterly	Quarterly	Monthly	Weekly
	Ensure computers have adequate firewall protection and data are backed up on disks which are stored off campus.		X	X	X	X	X

### Epidemiology and Surveillance

REFERENCE NUMBER	RECOMMENDATIONS / CONSIDERATIONS	ENTITY	GREEN	BLUE	YELLOW	ORANGE	RED
	Conduct epidemiologic investigation; coordinate with law enforcement, UDOH, FBI as needed						X
	Activate Enhanced Surveillance Protocol and monitor community indicators		X	X	X	X	X
	Establish Public Health surveillance for potential toxic exposures following an emergency						X
	Determine need for isolation or quarantine measures and activate Protocol if needed						X
	Coordinate Veterinary Risk Assessment – Investigation – Control Measures						X
	Report clusters of illness, health syndromes and trends to the Utah Department of Health, Office of Epidemiology (1-888-374-8824).		X	X	X	X	X

### Public Affairs

REFERENCE NUMBER	RECOMMENDATIONS / CONSIDERATIONS	ENTITY	GREEN	BLUE	YELLOW	ORANGE	RED
	Closely monitor news events		X	X	X	X	X
	Evaluate information on websites		X	X	X	X	X
	Update websites to provide up to date information to the community		X	X	X	X	X
	Actively support the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program		X	X	X	X	X
	Produce incentives, brochures, posters and educational materials for dissemination to the public		X	X	X	X	X
	Activate health department Emergency Media Plan					Consider	X
	Alert food establishments, water, and others of Public Health threat if needed					Consider	X

### Training

REFERENCE NUMBER	RECOMMENDATIONS / CONSIDERATIONS	ENTITY	GREEN	BLUE	YELLOW	ORANGE	RED
	Train employees as appropriate to ensure their understanding of procedures for identifying and reporting suspicious activities, packages and bomb threats.		X	X	X	X	X
	Conduct training, exercises, and workshops to familiarize personnel with emergency response plans and responsibilities		X	X	X	X	X

## **APPENDIX D. IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ISRAELIS ON TERRORISM**

This appendix includes important lessons learned from the Israelis from over 55 years of dealing with terrorism. I think it is important to learn as much as possible from one of the top experts in the world.

### **A. TERRORISM IN ISRAEL**

Terrorism in Israel started in 1948 and has remained consistent throughout this period to the present. The terror began with guerrilla raids and progressed to airline hijackings, hostage taking, and the attacks on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. The most violent of the terrorist campaign was the attacks along the Tele Aviv-Haifa highway, attacking buses and cars and killing 35 and wounding 24 Israelis. The main organization campaigning against Israel is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and is still around today. Many extremist organizations have split off of the PLO with many maintaining the same objectives against Israel.<sup>62</sup>

Early into the terrorism culture, the Israelis were concerned with two things; 1) most PLO attacks were against civilians and 2) Israeli governments are sensitive to civilian casualties. Therefore, the Israelis developed a sophisticated counter-terrorism system to develop defense measures designed to deter terrorist attacks and defend against civilian casualties.<sup>63</sup> Surprisingly enough to this day, the government does not have a formalized strategy or policy to deal with the challenges of the PLO. They adjust their actions to react to specific attacks as they occur.

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<sup>62</sup> United States Library of Congress, Library of Congress Country Studies, Israel, December 1988.

<sup>63</sup> Ariel Merari, "Israel's Preparedness for High Consequence Terrorism," Arnold M. Howitt, Robyn L. Pangi, Countering Terrorism, Dimension of Preparedness, 2003, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

The elaborate defensive measures implemented by the Israelis include target hardening, public participation and preemptive strikes and legal measures. This measure has been very successful against WMD attacks and is the reason for the increased suicide bombing because the larger acts of terrorism have been deterred.

Today, suicide bombers are the medium of attack. Even with the extensive Israeli security and intelligence structure, a suicide bomber can walk into a market area or on to a school bus and kill many innocent people. Israel has implemented a very aggressive anti-suicide bomber campaign, which seems to be working.<sup>64</sup> Of all the violence Israel has dealt with hostage incidents and suicide bombers have imposed the most psychological and political damage on the country. In the last two years, over 600 Israelis have been killed in 13,000 attacks.<sup>65</sup>

Throughout, Israeli society remains determined to resist the effects of violence on their way of life. Many citizens including women and children have died and unfortunately will continue to die. Their society accepts or tolerates the actions of the terrorists. The Israelis have strengthened themselves to deal with this terror everyday. To give in, to fail and to acknowledge the success of terrorism on their country, is not acceptable. Therefore, the culture adjusts, response measures are implemented and society continues.

The military and the Israelis police have taken appropriate response measures against the PLO for each act of terror. However, the most successful response initiated by the Israelis is education and the training of the citizens. Public awareness is the single most important element of success in the fight on terrorism.<sup>66</sup> There are 55 years of lessons learned from terrorist attacks; the

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<sup>64</sup> Hoffman, Mark, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2003, pp. 40-47.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>66</sup> The Israel Experience in Homeland Security, Presentation and briefing at the National Emergency Management Association meetings Washington DC, February 2003, There are four points to the Israelis program and they are Public Awareness and Participation, Coordinating the Response Elements, Israel Defensive Force (IDF) Command and NBC Preparedness, Hospital Preparedness and the National Center for Medical Simulation.

United States should take note of for potential response measures and educating citizens. Israel has implemented an extensive terrorism response measures that has been developed from trial and error throughout the years.

## **B. PUBLIC AWARENESS AND PARTICIPATION**

The Israelis believe terrorism is a means of “warfare using all possible means, both physical and psychological against its targets. Psychological warfare is the only existing warfare in which the target remains intact while the means are those that get killed or destroyed.”<sup>67</sup> The targets, in this case, are the citizens of Israel and the only way to fight terrorism is to get the target audience involved.

The purpose of the terrorist act is to change the beliefs or behaviors of an individual, group or government. The Israelis strategy is to have the public involved in every level of the fight and change behavior.

The Israelis engaged in an extensive cooperative effort between the police, security agencies and the public. It was determined there needed to be a new culture and a new strategy to win the war on terrorism. The goals of cooperation were:

- Prevent terrorism and minimize damage
- Prevent public panic and extreme reactions
- Channel the public to act productively
- Develop a communications infrastructure<sup>68</sup>

The key to reducing fear is the get the public educated, involved and increase the awareness of terrorism. Training of the Israelis included: preparedness, motivation, security measures prior to an attack, reactive behavior to an attack, how to communicate and emergency planning and exercise, etc.

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<sup>67</sup> The Israel Experience in Homeland Security, Presentation and briefing at the National Emergency Management Association meetings Washington DC, February 2003, contact [www.tix.co.il](http://www.tix.co.il) for more information on their presentation, Accessed May 2004.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

The Israelis started the civil guard in 1974, which worked directly with the national police. By 1982, there were 84,000 volunteers, 1,200 commanders and paid staff.<sup>69</sup> Today the numbers are down to approximately 50,000. Each must serve four hours per month with their neighborhood patrols.

Israeli citizens became experts in many fields as volunteers, for response, notification, clean up, victim identification, first aid, recovery, bomb squads and SWAT teams. The level of expertise and skill in each specialty area is impressive, but is vital to the success they have for treating a suicide bomb site like a traffic accident. The Israeli citizens have been well trained in terrorist identification skills averaging 600 calls per day to authorities on suspicious activity. The average confirmation of activity is .09%.<sup>70</sup>

The Israeli success on fighting terrorism has been attributed to the involvement of the citizens through formalized participation and the public alertness and awareness campaign. The majority of the bombs placed in public locations have been identified by the public and many of the bombs were neutralized before they could detonate. The Israeli police produce commercials on TV and utilize other mediums to enhance public awareness. The bottom line is terrorism in Israel is a concern to everyone and a high priority. They are determined to succeed.<sup>71</sup> Get in, clean it up and move on.

The fear of terror is reduced by involvement and awareness. The task was not easy and did not happen overnight, it took a new generation, a new strategy, a high priority and proactive approach to be successful.

### **C. ISRAELIS SUMMARY POINTS**

- The Israelis have endured 55 years of terrorism through WMD attacks and suicide bombers.
- The Israelis do not have an official documented strategy, they manage to adjust and implement very aggressive counter terrorism measures.

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

- They are successful because of the proactive public awareness and involvement campaign.
- Israel does not have a Homeland Security Advisory System they invoke a state of emergency alert, which activates security and response measures.
- The citizens are involved at every level of response and awareness. This dedication has reduced the level of psychological harm.
- Suicide bombers and the threat of chemical or biological attack still weigh heavy on the minds of the citizens.
- The war on terrorism is a high priority.

The Israelis case concluded that thru aggressive counter-terrorism measures and proactive involvement of the public, WMD acts can be deterred or mitigated. Fear of civilians will diminish through communicating and involving the public in every element of counter terrorism system. Warning systems are not needed but a robust response system through repetition by all Israelis helps in reassuring the public.

- Open source intelligence, shared throughout public safety
- A horizontal and vertical communication system and protocol to disseminate information

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